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Abstract:
We study the nature of career concerns of regional leaders in Soviet Russia under 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev. We document a substantial over-time variation in career 
concerns associated with reforms of Soviet governing hierarchy.  We demonstrate that 
Khrushchev’s   “Sovnarkhoz”  system—a   unique   episode   in   Soviet   history,   when   a 
traditional Soviet unitary-form (U-form) hierarchy was replaced by a multidivisional-form 
(M-form)   organization—created   yardstick   competition   in   industrial   performance   of 
regional  leaders.  High-powered  career  incentives,  however,  did  not  result  in  faster 
industrial growth on average. We find that only two groups of regional leaders performed 
better in response to increased incentives. 1) Leaders appointed during “Sovnarkhoz” were 
able to learn new rules better. 2) Leaders with good connections to their neighbors were 
able to overcome negative inter-regional externalities, a common byproduct of M-form. 
The lack of success of the “Sovnarkhoz” system triggered the separation of regional units 
along production branch lines, which, as we show, led to a substantial decrease of industrial 
growth rates. The failure of Khrushchev's management reforms together with the U-form 
lobby  contributed to his dismissal and reinstatement of the U-form hierarchy under 
Brezhnev.
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Career concerns are an important determinant of performance and stability of any political 
hierarchy. They, in turn, depend on the organizational form of the hierarchy. Starting with 
Chandler (1962) and Williamson (1975), an extensive theoretical economic literature 
considered incentive aspects of differences between M-form (multidivisional form) and U-
form (unitary form) hierarchies. The form describes the organization of a hierarchy into 
divisions: the M-form hierarchy is comprised of a collection of fairly self-contained 
territorial divisions  implementing  the same tasks, whereas the U-form hierarchy is 
organized along functional lines and consists of a number of departments implementing 
complementary tasks on the same territory. Qian and Xu (1993) and Maskin, Qian and Xu 
(2000) argued that Soviet economy was a giant U-form hierarchy with political and 
economic orders directed via highly specialized sectoral ministries, while Chinese economy 
more closely resembles an M-form as it is comprised of relatively self-sufficient provinces. 
This economic literature highlighted tradeoffs between economies of scale, on the one 
hand, (arguably) better utilized by the U-form hierarchy, and power of career concerns 
created by yardstick competition (e.g., Holmstrom 1982 and Shleifer 1985) and flexibility 
(Qian, Roland and Xu 2006), on the other hand, characteristic of the M-form. Sociologists 
and political scientists also consider differences between organizational forms and argue 
that the U-form permits central authorities to limit involvement of lower-tier managers in 
strategic decision-making and maintain stability and order within the structure via personal 
control mechanisms better than the M-form (see, for instance, Palmer et al. 1993, Freeland 
1996).
In this paper, we investigate the nature of career concerns of regional party leaders in 
Soviet Russia, the largest republic in the USSR. In particular, we study economic and 
political factors that influenced career mobility under Nikita Khrushchev and early Leonid 
2Brezhnev. We show that career concerns varied substantially over time. Specifically, we 
study the unique episode in the Soviet history when Nikita Khrushchev dismantled the U-
form organization of Soviet industry and reorganized it along the lines of M-form 
hierarchy, namely, the “Sovnarkhoz” reform. Using panel data on regional performance 
and careers of regional leaders in Soviet Russia, we demonstrate that the reform created 
yardstick competition in industry among regional party leaders and that such competition 
was largely absent both before the reform and after its reversal. This finding contrasts with 
the premise of previous economic literature that treats Soviet system as a classic example 
of a U-form hierarchy and ignores substantial over-time variation associated with the 
“Sovnarkhoz” reform. 
Did the high-powered career concerns, present during the  “Sovnarkhoz”  reform, 
positively affect the countries’ industrial performance? Our analysis of the panel data on 
regional industrial growth show that career incentives during the “Sovnarkhoz” period did 
not result in faster industry growth on average. This seemingly puzzling fact sharply 
contrasts with the  results of Soviet-Chinese comparison by Qian and Xu (1993). We 
address this puzzle by studying the variation in regional leaders’ response to the change in 
incentives triggered by the organizational reform. We find that only two groups of regional 
leaders performed better in response to reform. First, leaders, who were appointed during 
“Sovnarkhoz” reform, were able to learn new rules better and adjust to them faster. This 
finding is consistent with the literature on the importance of the change in human capital to 
supplement incentives for economic transformation to take place (see, for instance, 
Barberis et al. 1996). Second, the leaders with good personal connections to their neighbors 
also exhibited higher growth performance in response to the reform. These leaders were 
better equipped to overcome negative inter-regional externalities, a common byproduct of 
3the M-form hierarchy (see, for instance, Musgrave 1969 and Oates 1972 in the context of 
federalism). 
Our findings on the  variation in responses of regional party leaders to incentives 
highlight two potential costs of organizational reform which switches to M-form from U 
form: transaction costs, associated with the need for new human capital, and inter-regional 
externalities. We argue that Khrushchev tried to address the initial failure of the M-form to 
deliver higher growth on average when he initiated his second organizational reform in late 
1962. The undertaken modification of the “Sovnarkhoz” system consisted of two major 
changes: 1) the enlargement of territorial divisions to cover several regions instead of a 
single region each, which was supposed to mitigate inter-regional externalities; and 2) the 
separation of regional units along production branch lines (into agricultural and industrial 
regional divisions), which was supposed to create additional positions for newcomers and 
address the need for new human capital. The second reform, however, proved to be 
completely counter productive as it deprived Khrushchev of political support of regional 
leaders (who lost power because of the split of territorial divisions in two sub-units) and led 
to a sharp decline in industrial growth rates (due to disorganization created by this 
restructuring of territorial divisions).  The failure of the two consecutive organizational 
reforms to deliver growth together with  the political opposition of a powerful interest 
group, comprised of ministerial leaders who lost power in this reform,  contributed to 
Khrushchev’s  dismissal   and   the  reversal  to   the  U-form  traditional   hierarchy   under 
Brezhnev. Overall, the Soviet experience demonstrates the potential severe difficulties in 
overcoming costs associated with M-form hierarchy and underlines a potential threat to 
political stability of the system associated with organizational reforms; as they are bound to 
created powerful groups in opposition to reforms. Such potential threat to political stability 
4may have contributed to Brezhnev’s reluctance to conduct organizational reforms in order 
to mitigate inefficiencies of Soviet economy throughout his leadership. 
We also document that regional agricultural performance affected regional leaders' 
careers during the whole period under study. This finding is consistent with the fact that the 
management of agriculture, in contrast to industry, in the Soviet Union was always 
organized as an M-form. In addition, we show that personal connections to the central 
leadership were an important determinant of careers of regional party leaders throughout 
the whole period, as one would expect from any management structure that relies on 
bureaucratic appointments.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews related literature. In section 
3, we provide stylized facts on the Soviet political hierarchy and overviews history of the 
“Sovnarkhoz” reform. In Section 4, we formulate our hypotheses. Section 5 describes the 
data. In Section 6, we present our findings. Section 7 concludes.
2. Related literature.
Our paper is related to several large strands of economic and economic history 
literatures. First, there is a large literature which studies agency problems of Soviet 
command economy. Starting with Berliner (1957) and Granik (1959), a large number of 
authors demonstrated that the command system of Soviet economy was inefficient due to 
the lack of transparency and excessive bureaucratization. To date, there is, however, little 
careful analysis of factors that allowed the system to work for such a long period of time 
despite all the inefficiencies (Gregory 2003). 
The determinants of careers of regional party leaders and state officials in the Soviet 
Union have been studied by Sovetologists in the 1960s and 1970s (Armstrong 1959, 
Blackwell 1972, Blackwell et al. 1973, Brzezinski and Huntington 1964, Frank 1971, 
5Hodnett 1965, Hough 1969, McAuley 1974, Oliver 1973, Stewart et al. 1972). The 
literature offered two theories of career advancement. According to the first theory, i.e., 
“patron-client model” (e.g., Brzezinski and Huntington 1964 and Armstrong 1959), 
personal connections to the central leadership determined bureaucrats’ vertical mobility in 
the   hierarchy.   According   to   the  second   view,   i.e.,   the   so-called   “rational-technical 
explanation” (e.g., Hough 1969), the main reason for promotions was performance, i.e., the 
ability to fulfill the plan. 
Most previous studies of career concerns of Soviet regional leaders relied on case-
study evidence. To the best of our knowledge there have been only two attempts of 
statistical analysis of determinants of career advancement of Soviet regional leaders: 
Stewart et al. (1972) and Blackwell et al. (1973). Both papers used a pooled cross-section 
of selective cases of regional party leaders’ turnover in attempt to test the “patron-client” 
vs. “rational-technical” model. Since econometric techniques used in these studies date 
back to the pre-PC epoch, their analyses suffer from intractability and biases from 
selection, omitted variables, and reverse causality. In contrast to these studies, we use the 
population of turnovers of Soviet regional party leaders collected from archival data and 
apply modern panel data econometrics to analyze these data.
Our paper is also closely related to the literature which links the success of China’s 
development in the last 30 years to the presence of high-powered career concerns for 
promotion of Chinese provincial leaders to the higher-level positions within the Chinese 
Communist party hierarchy (Blanchard and Shleifer 2001, Qian and Xu 1993, and Maskin, 
Qian and Xu 2000). Li and Zhou (2005), Chen, Li and Zhou (2005), and Gang (2007) 
found empirical support to these arguments by showing that the main criterion of 
promotion and demotion of provincial government officials in China have been the 
6provincial growth performance relative to the average performance and to performance 
under the predecessor. 
3. Regional leaders in Soviet Political Hierarchy: a Historical Background
3.1. Initial U-form hierarchy 
The Soviet Union, formally a federation, was in fact a very centralized state with a single 
center   of   decision-making   and   a   strict   top-down   hierarchy   of   authority.   Under 
Nomenklatura system, introduced in 1923, state officials at each level of the hierarchy were 
appointed by the higher-level officials (Levin 1997).
Since the beginning of five-year plans in 1928, Soviet industry was organized along 
production branch lines. Specialized ministries and departments managed all enterprises in 
corresponding sectors of the economy across all regions; one ministry was responsible for 
one production branch. There are at least two complementary reasons why the dictator (i.e., 
Stalin) chose such organizational form. First, it utilized better the economy of scales, on 
which Socialist industrialization of the 1930s relied heavily (Davies et al. 1994). Second, it 
ensured the dictator’s control over resource allocation which was the key instrument of 
power in the political economy of the 1930s (Gregory 2003, Gregory and Harrison 2005). 
The top-down branch hierarchies did not allow regional elites to succeed in appropriating 
control over resource allocation (Harris 1999).
In the traditional Soviet hierarchy regional authorities played a secondary role. In the 
economy with industry paying the most important role, they were mainly responsible for 
the production of local public goods and agriculture, as there were no economies of scale in 
agriculture for technological reasons. Regional party leaders – first party secretaries – de 
facto were the top regional executives, despite the fact that formally state officials 
(governors) were the region heads. Governors were subordinated to their party bosses.
7Recent historical research in  declassified Soviet archives provides new details on 
factors influencing career mobility of regional leaders. Historical documents published in 
Denisov et al. (2004) demonstrate that the center carefully monitored regional leaders. 
Regional party organization had to report to the center at least once a year and regularly 
present information about performance of local managers (Denisov et al. 2004 document 
#18, 26/01/1953; document #21, 05/10/46). The volume describes several cases of local 
party secretaries’ demotions after the Second World war; in several of them poor economic 
performance of regions was named by higher officials as an important reason of removals 
of regional leaders (see cases of Vladimir and Ivanovo 1947, Ryasan’ 1948, Kursk 1950, 
Kirov 1952 etc.: documents # 76-78; 82; 119-121; 127-130 in Denisov et al. 2004). These 
cases suggest that the central government paid special attention to regional agricultural 
performance and, especially, to the fulfillment of area-under-crops plans.
There is some historical evidence that political connections were also important for 
regional leaders’ careers (Khlevnuk 2003). For instance, in the 1920s Stalin used his 
position of the General Secretary of the Communist party to place his supporters to the key 
positions in the apparatus, including regional offices. Lazarev and Gregory (2004) provide 
a case-study of cars’ allocation among party elites which demonstrates that the dictator also 
used his control over distribution of resources to maintain loyalty of the supports. 
3.2. Introduction of M-form: “Sovnarkhoz” reform
Stalin’s death in March 1953  triggered a power struggle among the closest Stalin’s 
subordinates. This power struggle led to several consecutive reorganizations of the 
governing hierarchy (Ballis 1961, Swearer 1959). Table 1 overviews the main historical 
events in this power struggle and organizational reforms which were set off by it.
Table 1 somewhere here.
8In March 1953 Khrushchev was not on the top of the list of the most likely Stalin’s 
successors. The main candidate, Georgii Malenkov, inherited the post of the head of the 
Soviet government from the dictator, while Khrushchev became ‘just’ a party secretary, 
and was promoted to the first party secretary in September 1953 (the position did not exist 
before that). During the next four years Khrushchev and Malenkov were in a political 
battle. Malenkov, as the head of the Soviet government, had political support of the state 
apparatus, including production branch ministries. In contrast, Khrushchev, as the leader of 
the party, relied heavily on the party’s political support, and, especially, on the regional 
party secretaries. 
Khrushchev acquired the support of regional party leaders by means of canceling 
secret police monitoring of their work and granting them more authority in local decision-
making (Khlevnuk et al. 2009). In addition, Khrushchev promoted many of his supporters 
to the key regional positions (Rigby 1984, Khelvnuk 2003). At the same time, however, 
Khrushchev publicly proclaimed on several occasions that the performance of regional 
officials was an important factor determining their carriers (Ballis 1961; Tomilina et al. 
2009 vol. 2, p. 233). The apparatus of the party Central Committee continued to monitor 
activities of local officials including “their ability to realize the party policy in practice” 
(Khlevnuk et al. 2009 document # 33, 23.07.1955). Special archive with records of regional 
development was established in the central party apparatus (Khlevnuk et al. 2009 document 
# 32, 30.03.1955). Khlevnuk et al. (2009) published recently declassified historical 
documents which show that in many cases in those years the dismissal of regional leaders 
was caused by the poor performance of regions under their control (Bryansk 1954; 
Yaroslavl’ 1954; Karelia 1955; Vologda 1955; Sverdlovsk 1955 etc. documents # 11-12; 
13-15; 16; 17; 18).
9In January 1955, Khrushchev managed to dismiss Malenkov from the Prime Minister 
position, but Malenkov remained a member of the Presidium of the Communist party (an 
official name of Politburo under Khrushchev) (Fursenko et al. 2004, p. 35, protocol of the 
Presidium/Politburo meeting on 22.01.1955). The power struggle reached culmination in 
1957 when Khrushchev’s initiated a major organizational reform of the economic and 
political hierarchy. In late January 1957, Khrushchev started the so-called “Sovnarkhoz” 
reform. The essence of the reform was in abolition of the production branch industrial 
ministries and establishment of the regional bodies, called “Sovnarkhozes,” i.e., literary 
Soviet councils of national economy, which were supposed to oversee and manage industry 
and construction  in the regions (Fursenko et al. 2004 p. 221-223 protocol of the 
Presidium/Politburo meeting on 28.01.1955). Thus, the reform made regional officials 
responsible for industrial development of their regions. This meant a drastic reallocation of 
power from ministerial elite in the center to the regional elites, and, almost importantly, to 
regional party leaders. Publicly, Khrushchev explained the reform by the necessity to 
overcome negative elements of the ministerial system – narrow departments’ interests and 
ministerial autarky (Hoeffding 1957; Swearer 1959).
The reform  was implemented very fast. Central party committee approved the 
“Sovnarkhoz” initiative in February 1957 and a formal law introducing the system took 
force on May 10 of the same year. The ministerial lobby in the Presidium/Politburo tried to 
sabotage   the   reform   (Fursenko   et   al.   2004   pp.   221-223,   236-241   protocol   of   the 
Presidium/Politburo meeting on 28.01.1957, 22.03.1957; Kovaleva et al. 1998 pp. 194 - 
195). Moreover, having a majority in the Presidium/Politburo of the central committee of 
the Communist party, the ministerial lobby attempted to dismiss Khrushchev from his 
office in June 1957. In response, Khrushchev called a meeting of the Central committee, 
where regional secretaries constituted a majority, in which he managed to crush the 
10opposition (the so-called “anti-party group of Malenkov-Molotov-Kaganovich”). Soon 
Khrushchev became the undisputable leader of the country: in April 1958 he replaced 
Bulganin, who was discredited by his support of the ‘anti-party’ group, in the office of the 
head of the Soviet government. Khrushchev’s victory also meant that the realization of the 
“Sovnarkhoz” system was put into practice during the second half of 1957. The decree, 
September 26 1957 detailed the reorganization procedure (Swearer 1959, p. 52).
The “Sovnarkhoz” system was built through a trial-and-error process during late 1957 
– early 1958 years (Swearer 1961). Regional leaders lobbied for the widening of their 
authority (Swearer 1959 p. 56). Some of them went as far as suggesting to institute fiscal 
federalism (Churchward 1977). Khrushchev rejected these initiatives. The “Sovnarkhoz” 
reform did not mean decentralization of the Soviet political hierarchy; rather it meant 
reshaping its form (Hoeffding 1957, Swearer 1959, 1962a). Nonetheless, Khrushchev 
carefully took into account the interests of regional secretaries. Initially, Khrushchev 
envisioned few regional economic bodies (“Sovnarkhozes”), such that each “Sovnarkhoz” 
is responsible for several administrative regions. Regional officials, however, successfully 
lobbied   for   their   own   unshared   “Sovnarkhozes”  (Swearer   1959).   As   a   result,   105 
“Sovnarkhozes” were established in the USSR, 68 of them in Russian Federation.
1
Each “Sovnarkhoz” got authority over industry and construction in the region under 
its control. “Sovnakhozes” had to prepare a draft of regional plan in cooperation with 
Gosplan – the Central State Planning Body. After the government’s approval of the plan, 
they had to fulfill them. The center allocated resources for the realization of planned tasks. 
The power and responsibilities of Gosplan under “Sovnarkhoz” system greatly increased. It 
became the primary central authority, which defended national interests (Ballis 1961 pp. 
160-163; Hoefding 1957 pp. 73-74; Swearer 1959 pp. 54-58). 
1 There were 70 regions in Russian Federation at that time. North-west Sovnarkhoz that 
included Leningrad region, Novgorod region and Pskov region was the only exception.
11The role of regional party leaders in that system enormously increased. “Sovnarkhoz” 
officials admitted their subordination to the regional party organization (Ballis 1961 p. 162; 
Swearer 1962b p. 34). Khrushchev publicly and repeatedly pointed to the responsibility of 
regional party leaders for regional economic development. He also emphasized that they 
are rewarded and punished depending on region’s performance (Swearer 1962a p. 458; 
Swearer 1962b p. 37). In 1961, term limits and a turnover rule for party secretaries were 
added to the Party’s statute (but neither was fully enforced).
3.2.1. Inter-regional externalities as a by-product of     the “Sovnarkhoz” reform    
The main drawback of the “Sovnarkhoz” system was ‘localism’ in the behavior of 
regional authorities, as it was described by the central officials. Regions tried to compose 
plans favorite for their local interests at the expense of national development. They illegally 
reallocated resources, which they got from the center, in favor of local projects, from which 
they benefited directly, and paid priority to intra-regional deliveries that often resulted in 
inter-regional   deliveries   failures.   Contemporary   Soviet   press   was   full   of   examples 
describing such behavior which was heavily criticized (Swearer 1959 pp. 49, 51, 58). 
Recently declassified documents from the Soviet archives illustrate the magnitude of this 
phenomenon. So-called ‘non-planned’ investments – not included in the National plan and 
not authorized by the central planner – doubled after the introduction of the “Sovnarkhoz” 
system (Khlevnuk et al. 2009 document # 73, 28.11.1959). Narrow interests were a 
problem under Soviet ministerial system as well, but the magnitude of the effect of 
negative inter-ministerial externalities was presumably less than negative inter-regional 
externalities due to high level of vertical integration and autarky of production branch 
divisions (Gregory and Stuart 1998).
12The central authority made an effort to mitigate the problem. A law prescribing the 
priority of inter-regional contracts appeared already in April 1958 (Swearer 1959 p. 59; 
Swearer 1 962a p. 468). In May 1958 the Presidium/Politburo of the Communist party 
discussed and blamed the practice of illegal resource allocation which followed by a 
national campaign (Fursenko 2004, p. 309,  protocol of Politburo meeting on 06.08.1959). 
Administrative and criminal cases were opened against plan discipline violators (Swearer 
1959 p. 59; Khlevnuk et al. 2009 document # 77, 15.09.1962). Strict restrictions were 
introduced to regulate the use of resources and investment funds by regional authorities 
(Swearer 1962b p. 33) In 1960 and 1961 bodies, which were prescribed to coordinate inter-
regional economic development, were established: All-Russian, Ukrainian and Kazakhstan 
republican economic councils and councils for particular economic regions, like Urals, 
Central Asia etc. 
3.2.2. The stages of the reversal of     the ‘Sovnarkoz’ reform    
In order to  mitigate negative inter-regional externalities, Khrushchev initiated the 
second stage of “Sovnarkhoz” reform in September 1962 (Fursenko 2004 pp. 576-596; 
record of Khrushchev’s speech at the Presidium/Politburo meeting on 20.09.1962). The 
reform was realized in November-December of the same year. So-called state production 
branch committees were established in Moscow; they had to coordinate planning in 
corresponding sectors of economy. The management of the construction industry, i.e. the 
control over investments funds, was moved from regional “Sovnarkhozes” to the national 
State   construction   committee.   “Sovnarkhoz”  divisions   were   enlarged   to   overcome 
parochial   tendencies:   new   enlarged   “Sovnarkhozes”  typically   managed   several 
administrative regions (Mieczkowski 1965). Thus, each regional party unit, which covered 
a corresponding administrative region, covered only a part of the new “Sovnarkhoz”. In 
13practice this meant that several regional party secretaries had to supervise local economic 
activity and this created substantial disorganization.
In addition, trying to shape career incentives for party leaders, Khrushchev separated 
party units into separate industrial and agricultural party bodies in more than one half of the 
regions. Exceptions were made for autonomous national republics and regions with clearly 
pronounced agricultural specialization. Khrushchev stated that the new system would allow 
regional party secretaries to focus on a particular sector of the regional economy and help 
boosting economic performance (Fursenko 2004, pp. 576-596; record of Khrushchev’s 
speech at the Presidium/Politburo meeting on 20.09.1962). 
The  separation of regional party organizations extended the number of available 
regional party secretaries’ positions. This allowed some scholars to interpret the 1962 
reform as Khrushchev’s attempt to replace gradually the old regional elites in order to 
promote younger and more educated officials (Armstrong 1966).
2 The majority of ‘old’ 
regional party secretaries kept their jobs during the separation reform but lost one half of 
their power.  Thus, they strongly opposed this reorganization. 
Summarizing the changes caused by the 1962 reorganization, it should be noted that it 
substantially modified the ‘pure’ ‘Sovnarkhoz’ system which existed between 1958 and 
1962. In assessment of the results of 1962 reform, historians agree that the separation of 
party units caused a chaos in management and proved to be counter-productive (Hanson 
2003). 
Many writers name the separation of the party units as one of important reasons for 
the success of the coup against Khrushchev (Pikhoya 2000; Burlazkii 2008). The reason is 
that Khrushchev lost the political support of regional leaders who were members of the 
Central party committee. Importantly, only the ‘old’ secretaries were members of the 
2 There are some pieces of evidence that regional party elite started to turn into a kind of 
close club, which consisted of the generation promoted by Stalin after the Great terror and 
during the 1940s (Pikhoya 2000; Khlevnuk et al. 2009).
14Central party committee in 1964; and the ‘new’ secretaries promoted in 1962 were not.
3 In 
days after the dismissal of Khrushchev, Brezhnev re-united regional party organizations 
and fully restored the powers of the ‘old’ secretaries (Armstrong 1966).
The ministerial lobby in the center also played an important role in helping the 
Brezhnev’s plot against Khrushchev. Once Khrushchev was removed in October 1964, 
Alexei Kosygin – an influential Soviet industrial top-manager - became the head of the 
government, as a part of duumvirate with Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev and his allies in 
Moscow apparatus stated that “Sovnarkhoz” system undermined the power of the center 
(Fursenko 2004, pp. 862-872 protocol of the Presidium/Politburo meeting on 13.10.1964; 
Vestnik … 2006, p. 32-43 Record of Brezhnev’s speech at the meeting of Leningrad 
regional party organization on 12.07.1965). While the new government reintroduced 
production branch ministries almost in a year after the coup; Brezhnev and his allied 
planned this reform from the very first day in power (Tomilina 2009 p. 194; a draft of the 
Presidium/Politburo report to the Central party committee meeting on 13.10.1964). They 
arguably postponed the reform to ensure the support of regional elites for the coup’s 
success. The reintroduction of production branch ministerial system deprived regional party 
secretaries of control over industry. 
Historians agree that turnover in the Kremlin also meant a change in the personnel 
policy.   Leonid   Brezhnev   relied   heavily   on   political   loyalty   in   his   relations   with 
subordinates (Pikhoya 2000). He promoted many of his former colleagues, e.g., Andrei 
Kirilenko, Nikolai Shchelokov and Vladimir Sherbitskii (Dneproterovsk clan, named at the 
city where Leonid Brezhnev was a regional party secretary in the Stalin’s time). In the 
3  The reform was planed and realized between the 22
nd  and 23rd Communist party 
congresses, occurred in 1961 and 1966 correspondingly. Only the congress formally could 
appoint the Central committee; and in 1961 future ‘new’ secretaries had too low political 
ranks to be elected into the committee.
15relations with regional elite Brezhnev introduced the policy of “no-turnover of cadres” 
which postulated no demotions except in the extraordinary circumstances (Khlevnuk 2003). 
4. Hypotheses
To formulate testable hypotheses we draw on stylized facts about career concerns of 
Soviet regional leaders before, during, and after the “Sovnarkhoz” reform. 
The “Sovnarkhoz” reform displaced the U-form organization of Soviet industry and 
instituted the M-form organization; after the reversal of the reform, U-form organization 
was reinstituted. Our aim is to study the incentive effects of such a drastic organizational 
change. We expect that the reform created yardstick competition in industry for regional 
leaders, which was not there before the reform and which was eliminated after its reversal 
in 1965. Thus, we test for whether the industrial performance of the region was an 
important determinant of regional leaders’ career advancement in the years between 1958 
and 1964 and was not such before and after. To preview our results, we do find empirical 
support to this hypothesis.
A drastic change in incentives of regional leaders should have translated into the 
change in behavior. We test for the overall outcome of the reform. In particular, we test 
whether party secretaries delivered higher than average growth rates in the period of 
reform. Theoretically, the result is ambiguous, as the change in behavior, if such change 
occurred, may have resulted in higher effort to deliver growth but also regional policies 
with negative inter-regional externalities. We also address the question of whether the 
response to the career incentives varied among regional leaders depending on their 
individual characteristics. To preview, we find that the high-powered incentives did not 
result in faster growth on average and there is important variation in response to incentives 
among party secretaries; only two groups of regional leaders - leaders with new human 
16capital specific for the organizational reform and leaders with good connections to their 
neighbors - performed better in response to increased incentives. In addition, we investigate 
separately what were the outcomes of the first and the second organizational reforms 
conducted in 1957 and 1962.
Furthermore,   we   test   whether   political   connections   to   the   central   leadership 
influenced regional leaders’ careers. We expect political connections to be an important 
determinant of career concerns during the whole period of Soviet history. 
The   “Sovnarkhoz”  reform   did   not   formally   affect   governance   of   agriculture, 
management of which was always organized as an M-form with administrative regions 
being its territorial divisions. Thus, we also test for yardstick competition in agriculture 
throughout the whole period under study. 
5. Data
We combine three sets of sources. We collect data on regional party secretaries’ turnovers, 
their profiles and regional economic performance. Archrival Politburo records organized by 
historians in a kind of data set (Denisov et al. 2004; Khlevnuk et al. 2009) contain data on 
regional party leaders’ appointments. Politburo records also provide information about 
reasons and future jobs of removed secretaries that help to classify their moves between 
positions and distinguish upward shifts, downward movements and stays at the same level. 
Goryachev (2005) and Khlevnuk et al. (2009) present biographies of regional leaders. We 
extract data on economic performance from 1956-1968 annual official statistical volumes 
for Russian federation (“Narodnoe khozyastvo RSFSR”). The time span of our study is 
determined by data availability. The intersection of three sets cover the time period 
between 1953 and 1967 plus the year of 1950, i.e. 16 years all-together. The dataset unit is 
a party leader of a region in a year. The total number of region-year observations in the 
17sample is 1158. The total number of regions is 85, but only 72 regions per year on average 
due to a series of administrative-territorial reforms. The appendix provides details on our 
data management procedure. 
The use of declassified archival information has the advantage of no gaps in data on 
appointments. The only appointments of first party secretaries which we did not include 
into our analysis are appointments of those secretaries who worked less than a year in their 
offices. There were 5 such secretaries in 1950 and between 1953 and 1967, one of whom 
died in his office. Table 2 summarizes the changes in career status of regional leaders. 
There were 72 cases of demotions, 55 cases of promotions  and 1031 region-year 
observations with regional first party secretaries either kept his/her office for another year 
or transferred to a similar position either in the central apparatus or in other regions. There 
was only one region, Tuva, where the only leader – Salchak Toka - ruled during the whole 
period under study. In eleven regions there were no cases of regional leaders’ upward or 
downward mobility: all transfers in these regions were lateral. In the remaining regions, 
there were on average three career transfers with an average tenure of slightly above four 
years. 
Table 2 somewhere here
Figure 1 plots the frequencies of both promotions and demotions over time. The 
termination  rate is more volatile than the promotion  rate. In 1961 the number  of 
terminations was three times larger than the average; nobody was demoted in 1964 and 
1966. The promotion level was between two and four during the most part of the period. 
Monthly levels of both termination and promotion vary between zero and three with two 
exceptions. Waves of appointments occurred in the years following Stalin’s death and 
Khrushchev’s victory over ‘anti-party’ group: 7 terminations in January 1954 and 5 
promotions in January 1958, accordingly.
18Figure 1 somewhere here
227 different persons occupied offices of regional party leaders in Soviet Russia in 
1950 and between 1953 and 1967. Using their biographies, we construct a number of 
variables describing their personal characteristics – age and tenure in office - and important 
facts in their careers.
4 We account for regional leaders’ experience of work together with 
the country leaders before they occupied important position in the Kremlin.
5  We also 
register for their experience of work or study in Moscow, where officials could acquire 
important connections. Due to the same reasoning we construct a dummy for the graduates 
of the ‘High Party School’. Table 3 presents summary statistics of these variables.
Table 3 somewhere here.
Our choice of variables on regional economic performance was determined by data 
availability. There are no data on regional GDP for the USSR or Soviet Russia. Regional 
industrial indexes are available, but there are no such aggregated variables for development 
of agricultural. We use a number of disaggregated variables instead – total area under 
crops, grain and meat production. Regional level data are missing for 1950 for the 
industrial growth rate variable and there no information on grain and meat production 
before 1957. Table 3 provides summary statistics on economic performance and table A1 
of the appendix reports correlation matrix. All economic performance variables vary 
substantially both across and within regions: thus, within and overall standard deviations of 
the area-under-crops variable are 461.2 and 1124.2, correspondingly.
According to official records,  Soviet industry grew at almost 10% in a year on 
average. Scholars agree that so high official rates of growth are the product of the Soviet 
methodology   of   aggregation   that   inflated   growth   rates.   Considering   that   Soviet 
4 We did not control for regional leaders’ gender once we have only one lady (Ekaterina 
Furtseva) in out database.
5 With Nikita Khrushchev for 1953 – 1964; and either with Leonid Brezhnev or Alexei 
Kosygin for 1965 – 1967. In 1950 nobody of regional leaders had experience of working 
with Stalin before he became the party leader in 1922.
19disaggregated series in natural units were correct and not falsified – the assumption that 
Soviet archives confirm (Harrison 2003) - Sovietologists invested huge efforts to produce 
from them a ‘true’ aggregated series of Soviet industrial development; they estimated that 
for the period 1953 - 1967 industrial growth was about 7.5 % (Bergson 1961, CIA 1990). 
There are no such estimates at the regional level. For our purposes, the upward bias of 
industrial rate figures is not a problem. The officials’ figures are the only numbers which 
the central government knew. We investigate whether reported figures on economic 
performance influenced the appointment decisions. 
6. Analysis 
6.1. The determinants of career concerns throughout the whole period under study
Our main dependent variable here is the indicator of career mobility of regional party 
secretaries; in each region and each year, we code it as “-1” for demotion, “0” for staying at 
the same level (keeping the same position or a lateral transfer) and “1” for promotion. We 
use linear OLS regression model with fixed region and year effects. To be precise, we 
estimate the following equation:
å + + + + + + =
g
it g g t i it it it it tD X P E y e d t j a g b ' ' '   (1)
where subscripts i and t index regions and years, respectively. E is a vector of independent 
variables which reflect economic performance of a region. We employ current economic 
performance variables because of ‘permanent monitoring’ principle formulated by Stalin as 
early as in 1934 (see Stalin’s speech at the 17
th  Party Congress – Hoover/RGANI 
59/2/1/92
6), according to which the center had to observe efforts and achievements of 
subordinators permanently and to intervene immediately whenever necessary. Moreover, 
6 Hoover/RGANI: “Archives of the Former Soviet State and Communist Party’ from the 
Russian State Archives of Recent History (Moscow) at the Hoover Institution of War, 
Revolution,   and   Peace   (Stanford,   CA).  Russian   archival   documents   are   numbered 
according to a standard system: collection, inventory, file, folio.
20previous achievements could work in opposite direction in the Soviet economy due to the 
nature of the planning system which was based on the ratchet principle such that previous 
achievements are used as a benchmark for evaluation of future performance (Gregory and 
Stuart 1998). We employ agricultural variables in levels and industrial growth variable in 
rates because of clearly pronounced trend in industrial development.  P  is a vector of 
independent variables which are proxies for connections of a regional party secretary. 
X is a vector of controls that includes annual regional population controls taken in 
logs and personal characteristics of the regional leaders, namely age and tenure in office. 
To account for potential non-linear influence of age onto career, we also include age square 
variable into our analyses. There is no retirement age problem due to the absence of forced 
retirement rules in the USSR. We need year dummies,  i j , to control for time shocks such 
as macroeconomic shocks or waves of appointments and regional dummies,  t t , to account 
for unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity. Given the size of Russia, we also introduce 
linear trends for mega regions - like North-West, Volga, Center, North Caucasus, Urals, 
West Siberia, East Siberia and Far East - to control for different development movements 
for different parts of the country which the central government most likely took into 
account.  D  is a set of dummies for linear trends for such mega regions and   g d   are 
coefficients on the mega-region-specific linear trends  g tD . Finally,  ε is an error term, 
assumed to be uncorrelated across regions, but not necessarily within regions (thus, we 
allow clusters at the level of regions).
Since our dependent variable is cardinal in nature, non linear models, such as ordered 
probit model, could potentially better fit data and give higher efficiency. Nonetheless, in 
our baseline specification, we employ linear regression model because fixed effects 
estimators for non-linear models can be severally biased due to incidental parameters 
21problem when time span of the panel is small (Fernandez-Val 2009). We, however, verified 
that all our results go through if we use the ordered probit instead of OLS.
Table 4 presents the estimation results for different specifications. Due to gaps in the 
data, changes in specifications cause shifts in periods under study. In the first column we 
report   results   of   the   specification,   which   includes   only   one   variable   on   economic 
performance - area-under-crops - and covers the largest time span, namely the period 
between 1953 and 1967 and the year of 1950. An inclusion of the industrial growth rate 
variable (column 2) eases on 1950, and an inclusion of meat production variable limits the 
sample to the 1958-1967 period only.
Table 4 somewhere here.
Let us first consider the political connections and agriculture, which we expect to 
matter throughout the whole period.  Estimated coefficients support our hypothesis on 
career determinants in the traditional Soviet hierarchy:  coefficients on variables on 
agricultural performance and of political proxies have the predicted sign and they are 
significant in all specifications at least at ten percent level, with only two exceptions. When 
the meat production variable is included into the model together with the area-under-crops 
variable, coefficient on the former becomes insignificant (column 3 of table 4). That is 
because these two agricultural variables are highly correlated (0.755); they are jointly 
significant at five percent level. The second exception is the effect of the ‘experience of 
work or study in Moscow’, which is a rather crude proxy for political connections and may 
be subject to severe measurement error, which would bias the coefficient towards zero (see 
column 2 of table 4).
The coefficient on industrial growth rate variable is positive but insignificant in the 
second specification. It becomes significant when we add the meat production variable into 
the estimated model. An inclusion of the meat variable, however, also decreases the sample 
22period. In the last column of the table we report regression results estimated for the 
specification   without  ‘meat’   but  under   short  time   span.   They   show   that  industrial 
performance matters only when we reduce the sample. In other words, during the whole 
period party regional leaders as heads of corresponding regional subunits cared only about 
agricultural performance and not industrial performance. 
Monitoring agricultural development, the central government evaluated first of all 
efforts which officials invested into agricultural development. In the specifications with 
grain production variable (not reported) its estimated coefficients are insignificant. Soviet 
government paid attention to grain inputs – area-under-crops, while climate conditions and 
accordingly harvest were out of their control. This finding is consistent with extensive 
character of Soviet agriculture, which heavily depended on weather.
Estimated coefficients on explanatory variables demonstrate that politics heavily 
affected regional party leaders’ careers in the Soviet hierarchy.  Coefficients in the 
specification with only area-under-crops as an explanatory variables on regional economic 
performance suggest that a regional leader without connections with Soviet leaders had to 
increase regional area-under-crops by more than two and a half (2.58) within region 
standard deviation (461.2) in order to have similar career perspectives. An increase of area-
under-crops by a bit less than one within region standard deviation (0.92) compensated for 
lack of connections in Moscow. 
The regressions also suggest that career perspectives worsened with age for younger 
cohorts of regional leaders, while improved after the age of fifty one. The coefficients on 
the age variable have negative sign and of the age squared have positive sign. This result is 
weak; estimated coefficients are significant at ten percent level only in the specification 
with area-under-crops as the sole variable on regional economic performance.  The 
population controls (not reported) and the tenure variable are insignificant. 
236.2. Did the “Sovnarkhoz” reform create yardstick competition in industry? 
To test for the effect of the “Sovnarkhoz” reform on regional leaders career concerns we 
add interaction terms between variables measuring economic performance and political 
connections, on the one hand, and the dummies for the ‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform period and two 
sub-periods before and after the 1962 modification, on the other hand. The reform time 
dummy is equal to one during the period 1958-1964. “Sovnarkhoz” were established in 
1957 but the system started to operate in full degree only since 1958. Brezhnev re-
established the ministerial system in September 1965, but the decision of “Sovnarkhoz’ 
dismantling was taken already at the end of 1964. We employ the end of the 1962 year as a 
border between sub-periods because the actual reorganization occurred in November-
December of that year. Only the coefficient on the interaction with industrial growth rates 
variable is significant; at the same time the industrial growth rate variable itself is 
insignificant. We report the results in table 5. 
Table 5 somewhere here.
The results  support our hypothesis that industrial performance was important for 
career advancements of regional leaders only under the “Sovnarkhoz”  system.  The 
coefficient on the interaction of the industrial growth variable with the time period of the 
Sovnarkhozy reform (column 1 of table 5) suggests that an increase of industrial growth 
rate by one standard deviation (namely, 0.07, once we consider only variation within 
region) is roughly equal to the effect of an increase of the area-under-crops by one standard 
deviation (461.2, also calculated within-region). These effects are 5.9 and 7.4 percentage 
point   increases   in   probability   of   promotion,   respectively.   This   is   consistent   with 
interpretation of the “Sovnarkhoz” system as an M-form hierarchal structure which brought 
24a yard-stick competition for regional leaders into industry. Our findings also show that the 
introduction of the ‘Sovnarkhoz” system did not affect importance of political connections.
We report regression results estimated for the specification with the interaction of the 
industrial growth variable with the early years of the reform excluding late years of the 
reform in the second column and with separate interactions for the early and late years of 
the reform in the third column of table 5. The magnitude of estimated coefficients on the 
interactions for early years is larger than on the interaction with the whole ‘Sovnarkhoz” 
period. This is consistent with the nature of the 1962 reform that complicated the task to 
evaluate achievements across regions. The effect of yardstick competition created by the 
reform was stronger before the 1962 modification.
6.3. Did regional leaders respond to the change in incentives?
To test whether the change in incentives resulted in the change in performance, we rely on 
overtime variation of industrial growth rates. Namely, we regress regional industrial growth 
rates on the dummy for the time of the reform controlling for the other variables that were 
found to affect regional leaders’ career advancement. It is important to note that reliance 
purely on overtime variation permits alternative interpretation of the results, as they may 
have been other things going on at the same time. Thus, one has to exercise caution in 
interpreting these results. We consider both the whole period of the ‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform as 
well as sub-periods before and after the 1962 modification of ‘Sovnarkhoz’ system. Thus, 
we estimate the following specification 
å + + + + + + =
g
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where the dependent variable z stands for industrial growth rate; R is the dummy for 
“Sovnarkhoz”  period (or sub-periods); A is an independent variables  which reflect 
agricultural performance of a region (area-under-crops); η and κ are coefficients and other 
25variables are the same as in the equation (1). We report results in the first three columns of 
table 6. 
Table 6 somewhere here.
If we consider the whole period, the ‘Sovnarkhozy’ reform did not result in higher 
growth in industry. The estimated coefficient on the reform variable is negative and 
significant. However, these results are primary driven by two extremely bad years, namely 
1963 and 1964, when separate agricultural and industrial regional party units operated. An 
exclusion of these two years changes the sign of the time dummy (see column 2 of table 6). 
Moreover, the results reported in the third column of the table suggest that regions, where 
party units were divided, demonstrated significantly worse results than the regions, where 
separation reform did not happen. The regions, where ‘old’ secretaries became industrial 
secretaries, reduced their industrial growth rate on 1.4 percents in 1963-1964 relative to 
average growth in other years (10.4 percents) and the regions, where ‘old’ secretaries 
became agricultural secretaries, reduced their industrial growth rate even more on 3.3 
percents.   These   findings   are   consistent   with   writings   of   historians   who   agree   in 
interpretation of 1962 Khrushchev’s reorganization as a reform that produced an extremely 
negative shock (Hanson 2003). 
The coefficient on ‘pure’ “Sovnarkhoz” system time dummy hints that the system 
operated better before the 1962 reform.  We find that this is strong for two groups of 
regional leaders who improved their performance substantially in response to increased 
incentives:   leaders   appointed   during   “pure”  “Sovnarkhoz”  period   and   leaders,   who 
graduated from the high party school. If we add dummy control for secretaries who were 
not appointed during the “pure”  “Sovnarkhoz” period and interaction of this dummy with 
“pure” “Sovnarkhoz”  period time dummy into our regression model, the estimated 
coefficient on ‘pure’ “Sovnarkhoz” period time dummy is positive and highly significant 
26(reported in the 4th column of table 6). Correspondingly, if we include party school 
graduation dummy and its intersection into our regression model, the estimated coefficient 
on ‘pure’ “Sovnarkhoz” period time dummy is also positive and highly significant (column 
6). These results hold even if we exclude regions with separated party units which saw a 
negative shock in 1963-64 (columns 5 and 7). Lack of significant correlations between 
party school alumni and secretaries appointed under the ‘pure’ “Sovnarkhoz” system (-
0.016) suggest that they represented two different groups of leaders who responded to the 
change in incentives.
Anecdotal   evidence   summarized   in   the   historical   section   implies   that   the 
“Sovnarkhoz”  system suffered heavily from the negative inter-regional externalities, a 
common byproduct of M-forms. Local officials had narrow interests that influenced 
harmfully onto development of other Soviet regions. We argue that regional leaders who 
graduated the party school acquired an important skill how to overcome this problem. They 
acquired officials from other regions during their study that gave them a chance to 
coordinate inter-regional issues directly and not to damage development of their neighbors. 
The majority of regional leaders spent a couple of years at the party school roughly at the 
same time, namely, in the late 1940s – early 1950s. This was a byproduct of Stalin’s 
regional policy when the dictator used the party school as a tool against regional networks 
and corruption, regularly moving regional officials to Moscow for short terms (Denisov et 
al. 2003) It is doubtless that regional leaders learned an advanced management their, 
because ideological issues dominated in the party school’s program (Khlevnuk et. al. 
2009).
Our   finding   that   recently   appointed   regional   leaders   worked   better   under 
“Sovnarkhoz” system points to the effect of positive transaction costs, associated with the 
need for new human capital, as another source of expenses generated by organizational 
27reform. It might be difficult for the old generation to learn quickly new rules of the game. 
The new system required new people who were able to adapt for radical reforms better; this 
phenomena has been also observed in Russia during the transition period forty year later 
(Barberis et al. 1996). Khrushchev’s long search for a stable system and continues 
management reforms strengthened this effect. Managers had few incentives to learn and 
follow new rules if the system was under permanent revision.
6.4. Sensitivity tests.
We conduct several sensitivity tests to make sure how robust our findings on career 
concerns in Soviet political hierarchy  are to alternative specifications and subsamples. 
First, we check how stable are our results relative to linear trends which we constructed for 
mega regions (like Volga, Urals etc.). We experiment either not accounting for such trends 
at all or allowing them to be non-linear. Second, we exclude observations of 1963 and 1964 
years for the regions where party units were divided into separate agricultural and industrial 
regional committees. Third, we repeat our exercises for the dataset without regions where 
only lateral transfers of regional leaders occurred. Table A2 and A3 of the appendix reports 
results of our main specifications. The chief variables of interest - area-under-crops and 
‘leader’ - are positive and significant at least at ten percent level in all specifications. 
Coefficients on the interaction are positive and significant in three of four specifications. 
The ‘Moscow’ variable is positive, but significant in only half of specifications.
Further, we test how sensitive our results are to the appointments occurred in 
Januaries. One can argue that such changes in offices were determined by previous year 
economic performance not the current one; due to two waves of January appointments their 
number is substantial in our dataset. Table A4 of the appendix reports the results estimated 
on the dataset where January appointments are excluded. The main variables of interest - 
28area-under-crops and ‘leader’ - are positive and significant at least at ten percent level in all 
specifications. Coefficients on the interaction are positive and significant. 
To test whether the significance of industrial growth rate variable is driven by 
‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform we used a number of interactions of industrial rates with different 
time dummy variables shifting time spans up and down relative to the  “Sovnarkhoz” 
reform. Table A5 of the appendix reports results of the specifications with such interaction 
terms. The coefficients on corresponding interaction terms are either insignificant or have 
higher corresponding p-values; their magnitude is also smaller in a half of cases.
Finally, we checked whether our results are sensitive to the functional form of the 
analyzed relationship between regional leaders’ career mobility and its determinants, using 
ordered probit and ordered logit models, as well probit and logit models for promotion and 
demotion separately. All results hold (not reported).
7. Conclusions
The main contribution of our analysis is to the empirical literature on the comparison 
of incentives of bureaucrats and outcomes in the U-form and M-form hierarchies. Previous 
economic literature – based primarily on cross-country comparisons – stresses the tradeoff 
between economies of scale (better realized in the U-form) and incentives (better realized 
in M-form). This literature agues that, in the absence of economies of scale, M-form 
produces   better   outcomes.   In   contrast   to   this   literature,   we   study   the   change   of 
organizational   form   within   one   country,   namely,   introduction   and   reversal   of   the 
“Sovnarkhoz” reform in the USSR. We use detailed annual regional-level panel data on 
political careers of regional party leaders, their background, and regional economic 
indicators to show that the “Sovnarkhoz” reform reorganized the management of Soviet 
Industry from U-form to M-form. This reform created  yardstick competition  between 
29regions and resulted in high-powered incentives for regional party leaders to deliver 
industrial growth. 
Such a sharp change in incentives, however, did not translate into higher industrial 
performance on average. We find that only two groups of regional leaders responded with 
increased industrial growth of their regions to the reform: the leaders appointed during 
“Sovnarkhoz”  period and the leaders with good connections to their neighbors.  Our 
analysis highlights the following potential economic costs of switching from U-form to M-
form hierarchy. First, there may be a need for new human capital to accompany the change 
in the organizational structure for an increase in incentives to translate into better outcomes 
(as leaders who were appointed before the reform were not able to adjust as well as 
newcomers). Second, yardstick competition under M-form may result in severe inter-
divisional externalities not internalized by the agents in charge of the competing divisions 
(as regional  Sovnarkhoz  divisions favored autarky in preparation of their plans and 
allocation of resources). 
Our  analysis   also   confirms   the  result  of   the  previous   literature   that   personal 
connections   are   an   important   determinant   of   career   advancement   in   bureaucratic 
hierarchies: during the whole period under study, regional party leaders’ careers were 
substantially   more   successful  if   they   had   better   political   connection   to   the  central 
leadership. We also show that growth in agricultural inputs significantly affected career 
concerns of Russia’s  regional leaders throughout the whole period under study; as 
agriculture, in contrast to industry, was always organized as an M-form in the Soviet 
Union.
The “Sovnarkhoz”  reform  episode  of the  Soviet  political  history also  vividly 
demonstrates   political   challenges   of   a   transition   from   U-form   to   M-form   political 
hierarchy. Such reorganization undermines power of branch elites, who therefore, become 
30the main opposition to the reform. If, however, the dictator is strong enough and can 
mobilize the winners from the reform, i.e., regional elites, he may be able to crush the 
opposition. The history of the 1957 failed coup d'état against Khrushchev illustrates this 
point. The success of the subsequent 1964 successful coup against Khrushchev, lead by 
Brezhnev, suggests that the support of the regional elite is crucial for sustainability of 
reform. The political support to Brezhnev’s plot came both from the central production 
branch elite and regional leaders who opposed the reorganization of M-form conducted by 
Khrushchev in 1962. We argue that the 1962 reform was a disaster from the organizational 
standpoint and show that it led to a sharp decline in industrial as well as agricultural 
growth. Right after the 1964 coup, Brezhnev reversed the reform and reintroduced the 
politically   stable   U-form   hierarchy.   The   story   of   the   fall   of   Khrushchev  and   his 
“Sovnarkhoz”  reform provides an illustration  for why inefficient—from the incentives’ 
point of view—U-form hierarchies such as the USSR persist for a long time. 
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36Table 1. Political struggle and organizational reforms under Khrushchev and early Brezhnev
Date Struggle for power Organizational reforms
March 1953 Stalin’s death
September 1953 Khrushchev was elected the First 
Party Secretary 
Khrushchev: ‘local and regional party 
secretaries are responsible for 
agriculture’
January 1955 Malenkov was dismissed from the 
Prime Minister position, but 
remained a member of the Politburo 
of the CPSU
February 1956 XX party congress: Khrushchev did 
not get a majority in the Politburo
Khrushchev: ‘regional party secretaries 
have to supervise economy’
January - June 1957 Discussion and elaboration of the 
‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform
June 1957 ‘Anti-party’ group tried to dismiss 
Khrushchev
Second half of 1957 Realization of the ‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform
April 1958 Bulganin retired from the Prime 
Minister position. Khrushchev 
combined the leadership of the party 
and the state apparatus
Law prescribing the priority of inter-
regional contracts
May 1958 The Politburo blamed ‘non-authorized’ 
allocation of resources by regions
June 1960 - April 
1961
Introductions of inter-regional bodies
October 1961 XXII party congress: limitation of the 




1962 reorganization of ‘Sovnarkhoz’ 
system: introduction of production 
branch ‘state committees’ (ministries), 
centralization of construction, 
separation of regional party committees 
and enlargement of economic regions
October 1964 Brezhnev dismissed Khrushchev in a 
party coupe 
November 1964 Reunification of party regional 
committees (reversal of the separation 
reform of 1962)
September 1965 Full restoration of the ministerial 
systemTable 2. Changes in career status
1950, 1953-67 1953-67
frequency % frequency %
Demotions 72 6.22 66 6.05
Stay in office or lateral transfer 1031 89.03 971 89
Promotions 55 4.75 54 4.95
Total 1158 100 1091 100
Source: Calculated using Denisov et al. (2004) and Khlevnuk et al. (2009) 

















































Source: Calculated using Denisov et al. (2004) and Khlevnuk et al. (2009) 
Table 3. Regional economic performance and characteristics of regional leaders, 1950 and 
1953-1967
Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Indrate (%) 1035 9.8 4.1 -12 31
Crops (area under crops in th. Ha) 1132 1048 1124.2 0 6066
Grain (in th. Tons) 842 1065 1322 0 7470
Meat (in th. Tons) 842 64.5 51 1.3 341
Party school 1154 0.35 0.48 0 1
Moscow 1154 0.7 0.46 0 1
Leader 1154 0.11 0.31 0 1
Age 1154 49.6 5.1 33 66
Age2 1154 2483.6 510.6 1089 4356
Tenure 1155 4.4 4.03 1 35
Source: Regional economic performance are calculated using Narodnoe khozyastvoe RSFSR v … Various 
issues, 1955-67; characteristics of regional leaders are from Denisov et al. (2004) and Khlevnuk et al. (2009) 
38Table 4. Determinants of regional leaders’ career mobility: regression results (OLS with 
fixed effect)
1 2 3 4 5
Period 1950 & 1953-67 1953-67 1953 & 1958-67
Area-under-crops 0.00016 0.00019 0.00016 0.00017
[0.00007]** [0.00008]** [0.00007]** [0.00007]**
Indrate 0.49 0.87 0.85 0.88
[0.31] [0.35]** [0.34]** [0.35]**
Meat 0.0013 0.0016
[0.001] [0.0009]*
Leader 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.18
[0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.07]** [0.08]** [0.07]**
Moscow 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09
[0.03]** [0.04] [0.05]* [0.05]* [0.05]*
Age -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06
[0.03]* [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05]
Age2 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
[0.0003]* [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005]
Tenure -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004
[0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Urban and rural population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends for mega regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1121 1000 741 741 741
Number of regions 80 77 74 74 74
R2 within 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.1 0.1
Standard errors in brackets; 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
39Table  5. Yardstick competition in industry under the ‘Sovnarkhoz’ system: regression 
results (OLS with fixed effect). 
Period 1953-1967 1953-1962 & 
1965-1967
1953-1967
Crops 0.00019 0.0002 0.00019
[0.00008]** [0.00008]** [0.00008]**
Indrate 0.12 0.1 0.12
[0.4] [0.41] [0.4]
Indrate*‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform (1958 – 1964) 0.84
[0.47]*








Leader 0.19 0.21 0.19
[0.06]*** [0.07]*** [0.06]***
Moscow 0.07 0.07 0.07
[0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Urban and rural population controls Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends for mega regions Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1000 864 1000
Number of regions 77 77 77
R2 within 0.1 0.11 0.1
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
40Table 6. Changes in industrial growth rate under the ‘Sovnarkhoz’ system: regression 
results (OLS with fixed effect)





Early years of ‘Sovnarkhoz’ 
reform (1958-1962)
0.005 0.0006 0.016 0.009 0.013 0.009













Secretaries not appointed 




Secretaries not appointed 
under early years of 
‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform * early 




Not party school graduates -0.004 -0.003
[0.006] [0.006]
Not party school graduates * 




Controls on agricultural 
performance and political 
connections
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Urban and Rural population 
controls (in logs)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personnel controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Are 1963-64 industrial and 
agricultural party secretaries 
included?
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1000 1000 1000 1000 916 1000 916
Number of regions 77 77 77 77 77 77 77
R2 within 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.1 0.07 0.1 0.07
Standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
41Appendix.
We  combine three sources of information to construct our dataset: (1) list of regional 
leaders’ appointments from archrival Presidium/Politburo records (Denisov et al. 2004; 
Khlevnuk   et   al.   2009;   also   available   at: 
http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/politics/research/SovietProvinces/    a   
rchive/FirstSecretaries.htm); (2) biographies of regional leaders from Goryachev (2005) 
and Khlevnuk et al. (2009); (3) data on regional economic performance from 1956-1968 
annual official statistical volumes for Russian federation (“Narodnoe khozyastvo RSFSR”). 
Our dataset includes only autonomous republics, oblast’s and kraies of Russian 
Federation, but not autonomous okrugs or autonomous oblsat’s given different decision-
making mechanisms on appointments of their leaders. The number of regions varied during 
the period under study as a result of series of administrative-territorial reforms. Several 
new regions like Belgorod (1954), Lipetsk (1954), Kalmikia (1957) etc. were established; 
others like Velikii Luki (1957), Kamentsk (1956), Balashev (1956) were divided between 
their neighbors; finally borders of several regions (Rostov, Volgograd, Saratov in 1956 or 
Pskov and Tver’ in 1957) were changed. Regions from the later group enter as separate 
pre- and post-reform units into our dataset. 
The only administrative reform, which we ignore in our dataset, is Khrushchev’s 
1962 separation reform. In 1963 – 1964 as a result of this reform, 43 regions had two 
regional party units (obkoms) and two first party secretaries instead of one: an industrial 
first secretary and an agricultural one. Party secretaries of former united party organizations 
(‘old’   secretaries)   in   their   overwhelming   majority   became   either   agricultural   party 
secretaries or industrial party secretaries. ‘New’ people were promoted to other positions 
(‘new’ secretaries). However, there was no turnover at all in the latter group during the two 
years, when the separated party units existed. Because of this we count only ‘old’ party 
42secretaries, matching them in our database with economic performance of corresponding 
regions despite the fact that these party secretaries were responsible only for agriculture in 
30 cases and only for industry in 13 cases. Our results hold if we exclude 1963 and 1964 
observations.
We employ the following classifying procedure, coding regional leaders’ careers. We 
consider positions in the Politburo or the Politburo’s Secretariat as promotions for regional 
leaders as well as posts of all-union ministers and their first-deputies, heads of Central 
party and State control commissions, heads of main departments in the Central Party 
Committee’s apparatus and posts of first secretaries of union republics. Ambassadors in 
socialist countries, key officials in the central party apparatus are equal in our classification 
to the position of a regional first party secretary. Finally, we count transfers to positions of 
regional second party secretaries, heads of regional governments, plant directors, etc. as 
demotions. We code the single case of suicide as a demotion. We also code retirement as 
demotion due to the absence of forced retirement age in the USSR. (Full description of our 
codification is available from the authors by request.) 
43Table A1. Pair-wise correlation matrix.
Indrate Crops Meat  Grain  Party
school







Grain0.03 0.88*** 0.81*** 1.0
Partyschool0.02 -0.05* -0.03 -0.05 1.0
Leader -0.02 0.0 0.09** 0.03 -0.11*** 1.0
Moscow -0.05 -0.11*** -0.04 -0.08** 0.46*** -0.01 1.0
Age -0.07** 0.02 0.08** 0.04 -0.04 0.06** 0.01 1.0
Age2 -0.08** 0.02 0.08** 0.03 -0.04 0.05* 0.01 0.99*** 1.0
Tenure 0.01 -0.1*** -0.14***-0.11 -0.1*** -0.12*** -0.14*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 1.0
Change in 
career status
0.0 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09** -0.01 0.12*** 0.03 0.05* 0.06** -0.02 1.0
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
44Table A2. Robustness check on regional leaders’ career concerns: regression results (OLS 
with fixed effect).
1 2 3 4 5 6
Period 1950 & 
1953-67
1953-67 1950 & 
1953-67
1953-67
Area-under-crops  0.00017 0.00020 0.00020 0.00014 0.00016 0.00016
[0.00007]** [0.00009]** [0.00009]** [0.00006]** [0.00008]* [0.00008]**
indrate 0.48 0.1 0.32 -0.13
[0.33] [0.4] [0.31] [0.41]
Indrate*‘Sovnarkhoz’ 
reform (1958 – 1964) 0.89 1.02
[0.51]* [0.5]**
leader 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.17
[0.07]*** [0.07]*** [0.07]*** [0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.06]***
Moscow 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06
[0.03]** [0.04]* [0.04]* [0.03]** [0.04] [0.04]
Age -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
[0.03]* [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04]
Age2 0.00 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006
[0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Tenure -0.0034 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Urban and rural 
population controls 
(in logs)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Are 1963-64 industrial 
and agricultural party 
secretaries included?
No No No Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends for 
mega regions
Yes Yes Yes No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1035 916 916 1121 1000 1000
Number of regions 80 77 77 80 77 77
R2 within 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
45Table A3. Robustness check on regional leaders’ career concerns: regression results (OLS 
with fixed effect).
1 2 3 4 5 6
Period 1950 & 1953-
67
1953-67 1950 & 
1953-67
1953-67
Area-under-crops  0.00017 0.00023 0.00023 0.00017 0.00020 0.00020
[0.00008]** [0.00009]** [0.00009]** [0.00008]** [0.00009]** [0.00009]**
indrate 0.4 0.14 0.56 0.14
[0.3] [0.37] [0.35] [0.47]
Indrate*‘Sovnarkhoz’ 
reform (1958 – 1964)
0.55 0.93
[0.52] [0.53]*
leader 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.2 0.2 0.2
[0.06]*** [0.07]*** [0.07]*** [0.06]*** [0.07]*** [0.07]***
Moscow 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.07
[0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03]** [0.05] [0.05]
Age -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
[0.03]** [0.04] [0.04]* [0.03] [0.04] [0.04]
Age2 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
[0.0003]** [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Tenure [0.005] -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
0.012 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
Urban and rural 
population controls 
(in logs)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends for 
mega regions
No No No Yes Yes Yes
Non-Linear trends 
for mega regions
Yes Yes Yes No No No
Are regions with 
only lateral transfers 
included ?
No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1121 1000 1000 1000 887 887
Number of regions 80 77 77 69 66 66
R2 within 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.11
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
46Table A4. Robustness check on regional leaders’ career concerns: regression results (OLS 
with fixed effect).
1 2 3
Period 1950 & 
1953-67
1953-67








leader 0.12 0.12 0.12
[0.06]** [0.06]* [0.06]**
Moscow 0.06 0.07 0.07
[0.03]** [0.04]* [0.04]*
Age -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
[0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
Age2 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
[0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Tenure -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Urban and rural population controls 
(in logs)
Yes Yes Yes
Are January appointments included? No No No
Linear trends for mega regions Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1085 967 967
Number of regions 80 77 77
R2 within 0.08 0.08 0.08
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
47Table A5 Robustness check on the ‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform (OLS with fixed effect).
1 2 3 4 5
Period 1953-1967
Crops 0.00019 0.00019 0.00019 0.00019 0.00018
[0.00008]** [0.00008]** [0.00008]** [0.00008]** [0.00008]**
Indrate 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.09
[0.4] [0.41] [0.38] [0.4] [0.41]
Leader 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
[0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.06]***
Moscow 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
[0.04] [0.04]* [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Indrate*‘Sovnarkhoz’ 
reform (1958 – 1964)
0.84
[0.47]*
Indrate * 1956-1962 dummy 0.87
[0.52]*
Indrate * 1957-63 dummy 0.74
[0.48]
Indrate * 1959-1965 dummy 1.08
[0.62]*
Indrate * 1960-1967 dummy 1.0
[0.7]
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Urban and rural population 
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends for mega 
regions
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Number of regions 77 0.10 77 77 0.10
R2 within 0.17 77 0.17 0.17 77
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
48